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THE STRUCTURE OF POLITCAL IDEOLOGY, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON  
VOTER TURNOUT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 AND 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article uses data from the 2000 and 2004 waves of the American National 
Election Survey to examine the influence of the ideological dimensions of moral-
traditionalism and market-fundamentalism on voter turnout.  The majority of the 
literature on voting behavior utilizes a single-dimensional measure of “ideology,” 
however, literature focused on the structure and organization of “ideology” suggests 
that it is multi-dimensional.  Studies using a multi-dimensional approach only rarely 
apply the framework to questions of civic and political participation.  In this paper, I 
seek to place these two disparate literatures in dialogue, by applying a dual-
dimensional ideological framework to the question of voter turnout.  My findings 
strongly support a dual-dimension conceptualization, in contrast to the single-
dimensional approach commonly utilized.  I find that nearly half of the population has 
a distinct political leaning on one dimension, while trending toward the center on the 
other.  I also find that each dimension’s influence on the decision to vote is 
independent of the other.  While both dimensions are organized within liberal-
conservative frameworks, each dimension is distinct, and both should not be 
combined into a single liberal/conservative ideological framework.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Citizen participation in the election process is essential to democracy, and it is 
beyond contestation that attitudes and values matter in the decision to vote.  However, 
the structure and organization of attitudes and values that influence voter turnout 
remain largely unsettled.  This paper focuses on the structure of political attitudes and 
values in the United States population, and how this structure influences presidential 
voter turnout.  To account for the influence of attitudes, studies commonly place 
individuals along a single liberal-conservative “ideological” dimension (Abramowitz 
and Saunders 2006; Lacy and Burden 1999; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 
2007; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004).  In this single-dimensional model, 
progressive beliefs place an individual closer to the Democratic Party, conservative 
beliefs place individuals closer to the Republicans and beliefs in the middle place 
individuals in a “moderate” category.  The problematic assumption of a single-
dimension conceptualization of ideology is that it presumes the host of beliefs and 
values held by an individual are organized around a single ideological dimension 
independent of subject matter.  Moreover, the single continuum ignores the rather 
basic distinction between the value constellations of market-fundamentalism and 
moral-traditionalism, which, I argue, is critical in understanding voter turnout. 
A single-dimension conceptualization of “ideology” may not empirically be 
supported.  Thomas Frank has argued that the working class votes Republican 
primarily because of moral issues, while the upper class votes Republican due to 
economic concerns (Frank 2004).  Frank adds that the working class is generally 
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progressive on economic issues, but since  the working class sees “Democrats [as] no 
longer speak[ing] to people on the losing end of a free market system,” many have 
moved to the Republican ranks (Frank 2004:245).  Frank’s key insight is that working 
class individuals simultaneously hold seemingly opposing value positions. Frank’s 
argument echoes a classic finding by Lipset (1983), nearly 48 years prior, claiming 
that the working class in the United States holds socially conservative and 
economically progressive values.   Additionally, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2005) 
argue that presidential candidates themselves must be placed on a two-dimensional 
ideological schema if we are to truly understand voting patterns in the 2000 
presidential election.  By separating economic and moral/traditionalist values into a 
two-dimensional framework, Frank, (2004) Lipset, (1983) and Fiorina et al. (2005) 
call into question the common liberal/conservative single-dimensional organization of 
political attitudes and values.   
The structure of political attitudes in the population is organized along a 
moral-traditionalist dimension and a market-fundamentalist dimension, both of which 
are organized within liberal/conservative frameworks.  More importantly, this 
distinction has significant ramifications for understanding voter turnout.  
Conceptualizing political attitudes within a two-dimensional framework provides a 
deeper understanding of the values motivating the decision to vote.   In general, 
previous literature on voting behavior primarily depends on a single-dimension “think 
of self as liberal or conservative” variable to control or account for “ideology” (e.g., 
Lacy and Burden 1999; Lacy and Monson 2002; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 
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2007).  But the literature focusing on multiple attitudinal and value dimensions only 
rarely addresses actual political action (e.g., Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Lipset 
1983).  In this paper, I seek to place these two literatures in dialogue, by analyzing the 
2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential elections.  The two-dimensional approach I employ 
illuminates the distribution of market-fundamentalist and moral-traditionalist values 
amongst social classes, and how this influences their voting behavior.  To empirically 
justify the “two-dimension” argument, I use least squares regression to test the 
existence of market-fundamentalism and moral-traditionalism in the population and 
map their distribution by race/ethnicity and class.  I then utilize multinomial logistic 
regression to evaluate several unified vote choice models, showing that a two-
dimensional approach allows for a better understanding of voter turnout than single-
dimension perspectives.   Individuals have complex attitudinal profiles that motivate 
their voting behavior, and understanding the organization of their constellations of 
values furthers our knowledge of why people vote and for whom. 
THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES AND VALUES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
“Ideological voting” is defined as a process where by individuals arrive at a decision 
to vote based on their political opinions, which are derived deductively from their 
principles and values (Dalton 2006; Lavine and Gschwend 2007) (for a critique see 
Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004).  Figure 1 outlines two competing theoretical processes 
for “ideological voting.”  The single ideological dimension is the most common 
perspective used in studies of voter turnout.   
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that shapes responses to a wide range of policy issues” (Abramowitz and Saunders 
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Saunders, Abramowitz, and Williamson 2005; Teixeira 1992). Commonly 
operationalized using a single item “think of self as liberal or conservative” scale, the 
single-dimension perspective assumes that progressive moral-traditionalist and pro-
welfare-state views tend to covary while market-fundamentalist and conservative 
moral-traditionalist values also tend to covary strongly within the population 
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Jacoby 1995; 
Lacy and Monson 2002; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007; Saunders and 
Abramowitz 2004) 1.   
Many other studies have found multiple distinct ideological or value 
dimensions that drive voting behavior.  Studies testing for multiple ideological 
dimensions conclude that most people use the liberal/conservative framework as a 
basic structuring principle to organize their political thinking (Conover and Feldman 
1981; Conover and Feldman 1984; Jennings 1990; Kerlinger 1984; Moskowitz and 
Jenkins 2004).  Several of these studies also find multiple ideological dimensions 
organized within liberal/conservative frameworks (Kerlinger 1984; Moskowitz and 
Jenkins 2004).  Using data from 1988, Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004) find evidence 
of three distinct ideological dimensions, which they label social liberalism, economic 
liberalism, and racial liberalism.  Alternatively, multi-dimensional studies argue for a 
social and an economic dimension, treating racial issues either as a subset of the 
social, or as parts of the social and economic dimensions (Fleishman 1988; Lipset 
                                                 
1 Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) also use an additive scale that combines social and economic 
attitude items into one dimension.  While an improvement over the classic single-dimensional 
construct, placing them on one dimension still creates many of the same weaknesses as the single 
variable operationalization. 
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1983; Lipset 1996).  Using a two-dimension approach, Lipset (1983) argues that those 
who are less educated and have less economic and personal security are more likely 
to be socially conservative or authoritarian, while remaining economically 
progressive.  Houtman (2003) adds nuance to Lipset’s (1983) findings showing that 
moral-traditionalist values flow from cultural capital and one’s education, while 
market-fundamentalist values tend to depend on one’s labor market position.2  From a 
multi-dimensional perspective an individual’s political ideology consists of their 
positions on a constellation of value dimensions, each organized within a 
liberal/conservative framework.  
Though the number of dimensions is contested, the evidence for more than 
one dimension demands a reinterpretation of previous single-continuum research.  
For example, using the single-dimension approach, liberal-conservative self 
identification is highly correlated with partisanship, party affiliation, vote choice, and 
voter turnout (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; 
Lacy and Burden 1999; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004).  Further, many studies 
using the single-continuum approach also argue that the U.S. population has 
substantially increased its ideological sophistication over the last 30 years, and that 
the political parties have been moving to ideologically distinct positions (Abramowitz 
and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Saunders and Abramowitz 
                                                 
2 The most common labels in the literature for the two major ideological dimensions are “social 
conservatism” and “economic conservatism.”  Lipset (1983, 1996, 1988) also uses the terms 
“egalitarianism” and “anti-statism.”  While the labels differ in the literature, the variables used to tap 
the economic and social dimensions are nearly identical. However, given the rich tradition of research 
from political psychology that characterizes conservatism as a psychological syndrome, and in an 
effort to be as accurate as possible, I use the labels “moral-traditionalism” and “market-
fundamentalism” to reference the economic and social value dimensions.   
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2004).  Lacy and Burden (1999) even show that self-identified liberals and 
conservatives vote more often, and more consistently, than self-identified moderates.  
Traditionally, these findings are viewed as support for a single-dimensional 
ideological framework.  However, from a multi-dimensional perspective these 
findings only imply that the U.S. population increasingly uses the left/right 
continuum as a basic structuring principle to organize political information, and these 
single-dimension studies have not tested multiple models to discover if this is indeed 
the case.   
On the other hand, multi-dimensional studies of ideology have only scantly 
addressed the issue of voting behavior and other types of political action.  For 
example, Fiorina et al. (2006) utilizes the multi-dimensional approach to show that 
economic ideology has not become less important over time, but the importance of a 
moral ideological dimension has also become politically salient.  Many other studies 
have also shown that moral traditionalist and market-fundamentalist values are 
disproportionately distributed among social classes (Brooks and Manza 1997a; 
Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Frank 2004; Houtman 2003; 
Lipset 1983).  But, studies applying a multi-dimensional ideological framework to 
any type of political action, let alone voter turnout, are the exception.  While the 
number of dimensions is still a matter of debate, there is substantial agreement that a 
moral-traditionalist dimension and a market-fundamentalist dimension exist (Fiorina, 
Abrams, and Pope 2006; Fleishman 1988; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004).  As such, 
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the systematic application of a dual-dimensional ideological framework to the voting 
turnout question within a sociological model represents the next intellectual step.    
In applying a dual-dimensional framework to the voting question, I look to 
demonstrate the substantive nuances missed by a single-dimension framework.  A 
low correlation between the separate moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist 
dimensions would indicate ideological inconsistency with a single-dimensional 
framework.  Because the two major parties each have ideological platforms that 
currently fit the single-dimension framework (Gelman and Park 2008), a low 
correlation would potentially indicate considerable differences between the 
ideological position of the parties and the population at large.  The differences in 
ideological layout between the population and parties themselves are important for 
understanding voting behavior because they directly impact each party’s ability to 
build electoral bases large enough to win elections.  Simply put, an empirically 
supported dual-dimension ideological framework suggests that parties rely on 
electoral coalitions as the foundation of electoral success, not electoral bases.   
Alternatively, there may be a negative correlation between the two dimensions.  
Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) argue that working class individuals are more moral 
traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist than the general population, while 
Brooks and Manza (1997a, 1997b, 1997c) argue that professionals tend to be slightly 
more market-fundamentalist than the general population, but much less moral 
traditionalist.  These findings imply a negative correlation between the moral-
traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions by class, depending largely on 
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how class is operationalized (Houtman 2003).  To further understand the distribution 
of the ideological bases of the major political parties, I examine the distribution of 
moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism within the population, utilizing a 
composite operationalization of class (income, occupation, and education).  If Lipset 
(1983) and Frank (2004) are correct, then the working class should have significantly 
higher mean scores on my moral-traditionalism scale and significantly lower mean 
scores on my market-fundamentalism scale when compared to the rest of the 
population.  Similarly, professionals should have significantly lower mean scores on 
my moral-traditionalism scale and significantly higher scores on my market-
fundamentalism scale.  I also examine mean differences of managers and the self-
employed.  Mapping the electorate in this way not only shows the ideological 
tendencies of class groupings, but also shows contradictions and patterns that would 
be missed if a single-dimensional approach were used.  These ideological subtleties 
between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions link the 
organization of political values and attitudes to the voting act, and their influences are 
obscured by a single-dimension framework. 
After clarifying the ideological landscape, I compare four models of voting 
behavior to test the fit of the dual-dimensional models in relation to single dimension 
approaches. Lacy and Burden (1999) found that ideology is the single largest 
predictor of vote choice and voter turnout utilizing a single-dimension measure.  If 
Lacy and Burden’s finding holds utilizing a dual-dimensional approach, then the 
ideological variation in the population takes on added importance.  For example, what 
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are the implications for turnout for those who are located in the ideological middle on 
one dimension, but have a pronounced position on the other?   Are the influences of 
each ideological dimension on voting behavior independent, or do they each influence 
the other dimension’s effects on voting behavior?  I test for this possibility by 
including a model with an interaction effect between both ideological dimensions.  
By mapping the U.S. population by class and ideological outlook within a dual-
dimensional framework and applying it to the voter turnout question, I show that the 
ideological layout of the population has implications for the voting act that a single-
dimensional framework is incapable of illuminating.  Let us now turn to a discussion 
of my data and methodology. 
DATA AND METHODS  
I compare competing models of voting behavior using a multinomial logistic 
regression of the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Surveys (ANES) pre and 
post election samples.  To make my analysis more comparable to the general body of 
research on mass belief systems, I specifically test the traditional single dimensional 
ideological framework against a dual-dimensional framework with a moral-
traditionalist dimension and a market-fundamentalist dimension, and then discuss its 
implications in the conclusion (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and 
Saunders 2006; Barker and Tinnick 2006; Basinger and Lavine 2005; Kerlinger 1984; 
Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004).  Abramowitz and Saunders (2006:178) make the case 
that over the past 40 years, “a substantial increase in the ability of citizens to apply 
ideological labels to the political parties, an increase in the coherence of citizens' 
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views across different issues, and a growing connection between the ideological 
labels that citizens choose and their positions on a wide range of domestic and foreign 
policy issues.”  I utilize the 2000 and 2004 ANES because, aside from its 
contemporary relevance, it should present the most ideologically sophisticated 
population in recent U.S. history (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Saunders and 
Abramowitz 2004).  Lavine and Gschwend (2007) find that ideological voting 
demands ideological ability and high motivation, while non-ideological voters rely on 
non-trivial character issues such as perceived leadership ability.  The increasing 
ideological sophistication of the population makes ideological motivations more 
relevant for understanding the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections, and as such, 
increases the importance of understanding the organization of ideology in the 
population.  If the dual-dimension framework provides a deeper understanding of 
voter behavior than the traditional single dimension approach, I will test for three or 
more dimensions over time in further research. 
VOTER TURNOUT, CHOICE, AND MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
The key dependent variable in this study is a trichotomous measure of voter 
turnout consisting of “did not vote,” “voted Democrat,” and “voted Republican.”  
Although multinomial logistic regression (MNLR) is capable of analyzing more than 
three categories, third parties were excluded because of a lack of sufficient cases.  
MNLR and a trichotomous measure of voter turnout were chosen because the 
decision to vote and the decision of whom to vote for are closely connected.  Lacy 
and Burden (1999) show that variables influencing turnout do so differently based on 
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the partisanship of the candidate, and factors that raise turnout for one candidate may 
lower or have no effect on turnout for the other.  For this reason, an aggregated 
turnout variable that combines everyone who voted into one category is inappropriate.   
Multiple studies have shown that ideology influences vote choice among voters 
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Basinger and 
Lavine 2005; Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and 
Manza 1997c; Dow and Endersby 2004; Kemmelmeier 2004; Lavine 2001; Lavine 
and Gschwend 2007).  However, the primary interest of this paper seeks to link a 
dual-dimensional structure of ideology to voter turnout as well.  Ideology is 
hypothesized to raise the probability of voting for one candidate while simultaneously 
lowering the probability of voting for the other.  As such, a trichotomous measure of 
voting behavior and the application of MNLR is appropriate.3   
I evaluate which ideological framework is a better indicator of voting 
behavior by comparing the goodness of fit of several models using the BIC statistic 
(which penalizes models with additional variables that only marginally improve 
explanatory power).4  In general, the smaller the BIC statistic the better the model fit.  
Having determined the best model, I then utilize predicted probability and multiple 
coefficient test procedures provided by STATA and SPost (a suite of programs for 
                                                 
3 The inclusion of abstention creates potential problems involving the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), an assumption that is built into the framework of multinomial logit models.  It 
would be preferable to model the unified voting process as constituting the three separate alternatives 
(did not vote, voted Republican, and voted Democrat) with correlated errors. However, while 
multinomial probit models for three alternatives that do not impose the IIA assumption are available, 
reliable statistical software is only available for multinomial models which assume uncorrelated errors, 
such as the one considered here.  It is important to note however, that the differences between MNL 
and MNP are negligible (allowing correlated errors) if utilizing a fully specified dependent variable in 
which all the actual categories are accounted (See Dow and Endersby 2004). 
4 All analyses were conducted using STATA 10 and data management was done using SPSS 13. 
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analyzing categorical data by Long and Freese (2006) in STATA) to test the 
substantive importance of ideology in understanding voter turnout. 
MEASURING IDEOLOGY AND CLASS 
The ANES data sets provide a large number of questions focusing on moral-
traditionalism and market-fundamentalism, as well as a measure intended to capture a 
single-dimension ideological construct.  To measure ideology in a single dimension 
framework I use the liberal/conservative self identification question in the ANES.  
With a range of one to seven, this question is commonly used in studies on voting 
behavior as the measure of an assumed single dimensional ideological construct 
(Lacy and Burden 1999; Lacy and Monson 2002; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 
2007).  The mean and standard deviation are indicated in Table 1.  To measure the 
moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist value structures, I use 22 core 
questions that have been used extensively in previous studies (Abramowitz and 
Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; 
Saunders and Abramowitz 2004).  The moral-traditionalism items focus on open-
mindedness, women’s rights, moral rigidity, homosexuality, abortion, and 
interpretation of the Bible.  Wording for the questions the moral-traditionalism scale 
is shown in Appendix A.  The moral-traditionalism scale has an adjusted Cronbach’s 
ά=.742 and a mean inter-item correlation of .207, meeting currently accepted 
statistical standards.  The market-fundamentalism scale focuses on the role of 
government in relation to ensuring economic welfare and military spending.  
Specifically, the questions addressed funding for public schools, border security, aid 
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to the poor, social security, foreign aid, and the general role of the government in 
providing services and a basic standard of living.  The specific questions are outlined 
in Appendix B.  The market-fundamentalism scale has an adjusted Cronbach’s 
ά=.744 and a mean inter-item correlation of .209, also meeting currently accepted 
statistical standards.  Items from both scales were recoded so that the most liberal 
response was 1 and the most conservative response was 5.5  Following Abramowitz 
and Saunders (2006) I recoded “don’t knows” in the middle category (3) of each 
subscale.  The moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales consist of the 
summed scores, with values ranging from a minimum of 11 to a maximum of 55.  
The sample is comprised of 2,190 cases with non-missing values on the key measures 
of interest.  Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
To test the Lipset (1983) and  Frank (2004) arguments that the working class 
tend to be more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist, I use a composite 
measure of class.  The class measure was constructed from the income, education, 
and occupation variables in the ANES dataset.  Some studies of voting behavior have 
repeatedly used occupation as the primary measure of class, while others focus on 
education and income (Bartels 2006; Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 
1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).  I combined the 
                                                 
5 Both scales were reduced to three factors using Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization.  The 
criteria for items remaining in each scale were as follows.  The loading had to be over .400 and had to 
be in a factor with at least one other item over .400.  The goal was to find the major content themes of 
the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist ideological dimensions, and as such, a uni-factorial 
outcome was neither expected nor necessary.  Craig and Martinez (2005) suggest that even 
psychometric properties are rarely, if ever, uni-factorial and that working toward such a goal is 
problematic, as individuals are extremely complex and not driven by single motivational syndromes. 
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Brooks and Manza occupation measure with the Bartels income and education 
approaches.  Education and income were each recoded into two categories and 
combined creating four categories: less then a bachelor’s degree and less than 60,000 
dollars a year, more than a bachelor’s degree and less than 60,000 a year, less then a 
bachelor’s degree, more than 60,000 dollars a year,  and finally more than a 
bachelor’s degree and more than 60,000 a year.  These categories were then applied 
to the 7 point measure of occupation used by Brooks and Manza (1997a, 1997b, 
1997c).  The categories that did not have enough N to analyze were put into a missing 
category along with the cases which had missing data in the income variable.  To 
evaluate the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments that the working class tends to 
be more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist, I effect coded the 
composite class measure, and separately regressed the measure of class on each 
ideological scale.  While effect coding utilizes an omitted category similar to dummy 
coding, the reference value is the grand sample mean.  The Lipset (1983) and Frank 
(2004) conclusions are based on comparisons to the rest of the population and not 
between class groups themselves.  As such, the use of effect coding is more 
appropriate than dummy coding in this case.  The omitted category used was the 
missing category, and the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.6   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 I also regress an effect coded measure of race/ethnicity on both scales to determine patterns of 
ideological organization.  For that analysis, the omitted category is also the “missing” category.  
However, the reference groups shown in Table 1 indicate the reference and omitted variable for the 
dummy coded variables used in the main multinomial logistic regression. 
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Table 1. 
Sample Means for Variables in the Analysis 
Variable Coding Mean/ 
Proportion 
(Std. Deviation) 
 Variable Coding Mean/ 
Proportion 
(Std. Deviation) 
Unified Vote Voter 
Turnout/Choice  
          Did Not Vote 
 
(ref.) 
          Voted Democrat .3840 
          Voted Republican .3877 
Moral-Traditionalism 
Scale 
33.871 
(8.219) 
 
Market-Fundamentalism 
Scale 
31.020 
(7.318) 
 
Single Dimension Lib/Con 
Scale 
4.37 
(2.353) 
Occupation: 
     Non-Fulltime-Labor 
 
(ref.) 
     Self-Employed .0922 
     Management/ 
     Supervisors 
.0767 
     Professionals .1420 
     Skilled Workers .0995 
     Routine White Collar       
Workers 
.1580 
     Semi/Un-Skilled 
Workers 
.1027 
Education: 
     Less Than High School 
 
(ref.) 
     High School .2863 
     Some College .3110 
     Bachelor’s Degree .2059 
     Advanced Degree .1110 
Race and Ethnicity: 
     White 
 
(ref.) 
     Black .1174 
     Asian .0169 
     Native American .0119 
     Hispanic .0543 
     Missing .0178 
Religion:  
     Protestant .3795 
     Catholic .2598 
     Jewish .0251 
     Missing .1434 
     Other (ref.) 
Interest in Politics: 
     Not Much  Interested 
 
(ref.) 
     Somewhat Interested .4352 
     Very Interested .4151 
Income: 
     Less than $2999.00 
 
(ref.) 
     $3,000-$19,999 .2164 
     $20,000-$39,999 .2826 
     $40,000-$59,999 .1886 
     $60,000-$79,999 .0484 
     $80,000-$119,999 .0580 
     $120,000-And Above .0288 
     Missing .0831 
  
Sex:  
     Male 
 
(ref.) 
     Female .5429 
Age 47.62 
(17.1) 
Year: 
     2000 
 
(ref.) 
     2004 .4466 
Composite Measure of 
Class 
 
Self-Employed  
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
4.0 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
1.1 
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/More than 60K 
1.2 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/More than 60K 
1.7 
Management/Supervisors  
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K  
2.7 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
2.4 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/More than 60K 
1.6 
 
Professionals  
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K  
3.0 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
7.2 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/More than 60K 
3.0 
Skilled Workers  
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
7.4 
Routine White Collar 
Workers 
 
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K  
11.2 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
2.3 
 More than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/More than 60K 
1.1 
Semi/Un-Skilled Workers  
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
8.8 
Non-Fulltime  
 Less Than a Bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K  
21.0 
 More than a bachelor’s 
 Degree/Less than 60K 
5.3 
 More than a bachelor’s 
 Degree/More than 60K 
1.6 
Missing 13.3 
Source: American National Election Survey (2000 and 2004). 
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THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
Because a unified vote choice model combines turnout and choice it is necessary to 
control for the traditional indicators of both.  Income, education, political interest, 
race/ethnicity, sex, and age have all been shown to be significant and substantively 
important predictors of voter turnout (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger 1980)  while religion, race/ethnicity, sex, 
income, and occupation have been shown to be substantively significant indicators of 
vote choice (Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 
1997c; Brooks and Manza 2004; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Greenberg 2005; 
Houtman 2003; Lipset 1983).  Ideological voting is not the only type of voting that 
occurs (Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007).  Political activity is limited by 
available resources and class interest (Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 
1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  The 
inclusion of theses controls provides a more rigorous test of the differences between 
the single and dual ideological constructs.  The descriptive statistics and 
operationalizations for each control variable are outlined in Table 1. 
RESULTS 
MORAL-TRADITIONALISM AND MARKET-FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE POPULATION 
 I examine the correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-
fundamentalist dimensions to assess whether these were independent or associated in 
the population.  A single-dimension approach assumes that those with strong market-
fundamentalist feelings should also hold strong moral-traditionalist feelings implying 
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a high correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist value 
dimensions.  The two dimensions may be largely independent; those individuals who 
have pronounced feelings on one dimension may hold an array of positions on the 
other.  The correlation coefficient between the moral-traditionalism scale and market-
fundamentalism scale is .386 (p<.001), suggesting a weak association between moral-
traditionalist and market-fundamentalist positions. The low correlation between these 
domains indicates differences between the ideological structure of population and the 
platforms and policies promoted by the major parties.  The ideological gap between 
the parties and the layout of the population is important because it forces hard choices 
by those who do not have views that are progressive on both dimensions or 
conservative on both dimensions when it comes to election season.  Thus, the 
organization of ideology in the population is linked to whether it empowers 
individuals to vote or acts as a constraining force to democracy.  The low correlation 
only indicates that such differences exist, but does not illustrate patterns of 
association in detail.  Ultimately, these bring the electoral coalitions of each party into 
sharper focus.  
Examination of racial/ethnic groups in the data indicates a distinct pattern 
underlying the low correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-
fundamentalist dimensions.  OLS regression indicates that blacks are significantly 
less market-fundamentalist than the rest of the population by just over three points 
(p<.001) on the market-fundamentalism scale, but do not differ from the population 
mean on the moral-traditionalism scale.  Asians, in contrast, score significantly lower 
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(p<.001) on the moral-traditionalism scale than the rest of the population by 4.568 
points, but are not significantly different from the rest of the population in terms of 
market-fundamentalism.  Whites were the only category to register a significantly 
higher (p<.05) mean from the general population mean on the moral-traditionalism 
scale and also have a significantly higher market-fundamentalism scale score 
(p<.001).  However, the mean difference in moral-traditionalism score from the 
general population was not substantively large with a value of 1.056.   Whites were, 
on the other hand, substantively larger on the market-fundamentalism scale than the 
general population with a value 2.812.  So, while the white category does have 
significantly higher scores on both scales, Whites still generally conform to the 
pattern of having a distinct ideological trend on one dimension while trending toward 
the center on the other.  These findings support the conclusion that there are at least 
two distinct ideological dimensions within the population, and that they are relatively 
independent of each other.  These patterns could be limited to racial/ethnic divisions.  
The Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments suggest that the working class should 
have higher than average moral-traditionalism scares and lower than average market-
fundamentalism scores.  Yet, if the composite measure of class provides evidence that 
class groups trend toward the center on one dimension while having pronounced 
feelings on the other, then the layout of the population suggest that there are six 
relatively distinct ideological bases that are split between the Republicans and the 
Democrats; those who are progressive on both dimensions, those who are 
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conservative on both dimensions, social progressives, economic progressives, social 
conservatives, and economic conservatives, with little overlap between the six groups. 
 Table 2 shows the coefficients from the separate OLS regressions of the 
moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales on my composite measure of 
class, to test the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) conclusions that the working class is 
more conservative in terms of moral-traditionalism while at the same time being more 
progressive in terms of market-fundamentalism.  If the working class have 
significantly higher mean scores on the moral-traditionalism scale compared to the 
general population, but have significantly lower scores on the market-fundamentalism 
scale, then the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments have empirical support.  In 
general, the working class has statistically distinct ideological positions which are 
more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist than the rest of the 
population.  But in many cases, the level of ideological commitment is not as strong 
as the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments would suggest.  Skilled workers 
who have less than a bachelor’s degree and make less than 60,000 dollars a year, for 
example, are much more moral-traditionalist than the general population.  Yet, while 
they are statistically more liberal in terms of their market-fundamentalist values with 
a mean difference of -1.149 (p<.05), this difference is not substantively engaging.  
The skilled working class follows a pattern of having a distinct ideological moral-
traditionalist position, but trends toward the center on the market-fundamentalist 
dimension.   
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Table 2. 
Difference from the Grand Mean of Moral-Traditionalism and Market- 
Fundamentalism 
On a Composite Measure of Class 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Moral-
Traditionalism Scale 
Grand Mean=33.871 
Market-Fundamentalism 
 Scale 
Grand Mean=31.020 
 Self-Employed   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
3.254*** 
(.843) 
.689 
(.759) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
-1.072 
(1.526) 
1.514 
(1.374) 
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/More than 60K 
2.844 
(1.470) 
3.929** 
(1.324) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/More than 60K 
.937 
(1.262) 
4.709*** 
(1.136) 
Management/Supervisors   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
.121 
(1.002) 
-1.419 
(.903) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
-2.020 
(1.072) 
-.924 
(.966) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/More than 60K 
-2.798* 
(1.296) 
-.143 
(1.167) 
Professionals   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
.349 
(.959) 
-2.840*** 
(.863) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
-2.674*** 
(.647) 
-1.892*** 
(.582) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/More than 60K 
-4.666*** 
(.965) 
-.947 
(.869) 
Skilled Workers   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
3.024*** 
(.638) 
-1.149* 
(.575) 
Routine White Collar Workers   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
1.560** 
(.538) 
-1.170* 
(.485) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
-.292 
(1.093) 
-1.966* 
(.984) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/More than 60K 
-2.232 
(1.526) 
5.434*** 
(1.374) 
Semi/Un-Skilled Workers   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
1.252* 
(.595) 
-2.833*** 
(.536) 
Non-Fulltime Workers   
Less Than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
3.008*** 
(.427) 
-1.703*** 
(.384) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/Less than 60K 
.305 
(.743) 
-.538 
(.669) 
More than a Bachelor’s 
Degree/More than 60K 
-3.369** 
(1.296) 
.486 
(1.167) 
      Note:  p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
 26
Semi and unskilled workers in the lowest education and income categories are much 
less market-fundamentalist than the general population by 2.833 points (p<.001) but 
differ only slightly on the moral-traditionalism dimension by 1.252 points (p<.05).  
Non-fulltime workers in the lowest income and education category have almost 
identical mean differences to the skilled worker category.  And routine white collar 
workers in the lowest income and education categories are not substantively different 
than the general population.  While the lowest income and education group in each of 
the working class categories statistically conformed to the hypothesis that each should 
be more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist, the substantive size of 
the mean differences indicate that the working class is, for the most part, strong 
position on one dimension and centrist on the other.  More importantly, however, the 
pattern is strikingly consistent across classes. 
In nearly every class category, the ideological pattern demonstrates that a 
distinct position by a group on one dimension is likely to correspond to a centrist 
position on the other dimension, and this has substantial implications for voting 
turnout.  It is important to note that with the exception of professionals with more 
than a bachelor’s degree who make more than 60,000 dollars a year, all class and 
race/ethnicity categories are roughly normally distributed around their mean points on 
both scales.7  The relatively normal distribution of the moral-traditionalism and 
market-fundamentalism scales on each class and race/ethnicity category indicates that 
                                                 
7 Professionals with more than a bachelor’s degree who make more than 60,000 dollars a year are 
normally distributed on the market-fundamentalism scale, but have a bimodal distribution on the 
moral-traditionalism scale.  One modal response is just above the grand mean and the other is well 
below.  In general, most professionals located in the highest category fall well below the grand mean.  
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while these groups have ideological trends, there are a fair number in each category 
that fall far below and above each group’s mean.  As such, there are also a small 
amount of individuals with conservative moral-traditionalists who are also 
conservative market-fundamentalists, as well as a number of individuals who are 
progressive on both scales.  These types of individuals are relatively rare (9.27 
percent is low on both scales, and 11.46 percent is high on both) and are far too small 
to represent the electoral bases of the major parties.  The low correlation between the 
moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions, the pattern of having a 
distinct position on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other, and 
the normal distributions of these populations along each dimension together show that 
the electoral bases of each party are more like ideological coalitions.  Table 3 
indicates those occupying the center 50 percent of both scales simultaneously only 
represent 29.09 percent of the population.  Low-centrists make up nearly 22 percent 
of the population, while high-centrists comprise 23.7 percent.   
Table 3. 
Cross-tabulation of Moral-Traditionalism Scale Score by  
Market-Fundamentalism Scale Score 
(N=2190) 
       
Moral-
Traditionalism 
Score  
      
Low 
0-25% 
Centrist 
26-75% 
High 
76-100% 
    
Low 
0-25% 
203 
(9.27) 
249 
(11.37) 
67 
(3.06) 
Market- 
Fundamentalism 
Score 
Centrist 
26-75% 
227 
(10.37) 
637 
(29.09) 
281 
(12.83) 
   
 
High 
76-100% 
60 
(2.74) 
238 
(10.87) 
251 
(11.46) 
Note: Parentheses indicate total percents.      
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The ideological pattern found in the population suggests that the influences of the 
moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions on voter behavior are 
relatively independent of each other, and raise questions about the strength of a single 
ideology as a motivating force for voter turnout.  Lacy and Burden (1999) that 
liberals and conservatives vote more than moderates, using a single ideological 
measure, but such a finding raises the question: why? (see also Lacy and Monson 
2002)  A dual-dimensional framework does not suffer from this problem.  Mapping 
the population on two dimensions clearly illustrates the ideological coalitions which 
the parties struggle to keep together.  To demonstrate the importance of the 
ideological patterns found in the population for understanding voting behavior, I turn 
to an analysis utilizing competing multinomial logistic regression models.  
THE STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGY AND VOTER TURNOUT 
If the population has a mass belief system that is two-dimensional and 
ideological stance has a strong impact on voter turnout, then my model of voting 
behavior utilizing two dimensions should be statically stronger and substantively 
more informative than a single-dimension model.  The use of two dimensions raises 
questions about what kind of influence each dimension will have on the other’s 
effects on voting behavior.  For example, does being strong on one dimension lessen 
the impact of the other’s influence on the voting act?  Similarly, does being moderate, 
apathetic, or ambivalent on one dimension, influence the impact of the other on the 
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voting act?8   To address all these questions I compare four nested competing unified 
vote choice models.  Model 1 contains the classic sociological predictors of vote 
choice and voter turnout such as sex, race/ethnicity, income, religion, occupation, 
political interest, and education.  Because the data are pooled cross sectional samples, 
I include year as a control variable as well.  Model 2 adds the commonly used, seven 
point “think of self as liberal or conservative” scale to measure ideology within a 
single-dimension framework.  In model 3, the single-dimension measure is replaced 
by the moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales.  Model 4 adds the 
interaction between the moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism measures.  
To evaluate model fit across specifications, I compare BIC statistics presented in 
Table 4.9   
Table 4. 
Competing Unified Vote Choice Models  
 
 LR x2 p-
value 
df BIC 
Model 1  No Ideological Measure 794.42 0.001 62 4393.697 
Model 2  Single-Dimensional Measure 1149.16 0.001 64 4054.338 
Model 3  Dual-Dimensional Measure 1407.34 0.001 66 3811.549 
Model 4  Dual-Dimensional Measure with 
Interaction 
1410.92 0.001 68 3823.346 
 
The findings in Table 4 provide compelling support for the dual-dimensional 
model, and indicate that ideology is important to understanding voter turnout.  The 
                                                 
8 Ambivalence is a psychological syndrome, which individuals in the center may or may not have.  I 
use the term moderate to refer to those individuals who are in the center of each dimension, yet are 
neither ambivalent nor apathetic. 
9 To evaluate these models, I follow Long and Freese (2004) and compare BIC statistics using 
Raftery’s (1995) interpretation index.  In general, lower BIC statistics indicate greater model fit, but 
the difference in size does matter.  On the other hand, any increase in the BIC statistic is considered 
very strong evidence for the model with the lower figure.   
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sociological model with no measure of ideology is the weakest by BIC statistic, and 
models 2 through 4 are all statistically superior in comparison to model 1.  However, 
model 3 is the strongest; there is no improvement of fit with the inclusion of the 
interaction.  Thus, using the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist 
dimensions to understand voting behavior should be preferred to single-dimension 
measures of ideology.  The influence of each dimension on voting behavior is 
relatively independent of the other, owing to no sign of interaction.  The finding of 
independence of effect between the two dimensions is important because it indicates 
that apathy, moderation or ambivalence on one dimension does not change the effect 
produced by a stronger position on the other dimension.  Given the ideological layout 
of the population, the relative importance of this finding lies in the substantive size of 
the influence each dimension has on voting behavior.  If the effect size is large, then 
ideological variations between classes take on added importance.  To better 
understand the extent to which ideology influences voter behavior and compare it to 
the classic sociological indicators, I use the results of model 3’s odds ratios for voting 
Republican or Democrat versus not voting.  Odds ratios and their 95 percent 
confidence intervals for model 3 are shown in Table 5. 
The moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales are the two most 
powerful influences on voting behavior in model 3, and both scale are significant 
(p<.001) in both equations.  The odds ratios are in the hypothesized direction; higher 
scores leading to support for the Republicans and lower scores leading to support for 
the Democrats.  The odds ratios look smaller than many other variables because of 
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the scale of the measures; however, converting odds ratios to predicted probabilities 
highlights the substantive impact on voting.   
Table 5. 
Competing Unified Vote Choice Models 
MNL of Unified Vote Choice on Ideology, and Controls   
Exp(B) and 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
Variable Model  3 
 Probability of 
Voting 
Democrat 
Probability of 
Voting 
Republican 
Moral-Traditionalism .9316*** 
[.9122, .9514] 
1.0673*** 
[1.0449, 1.0902] 
Market-Fundamentalism 
 
.9592*** 
[.9361, .9829] 
1.1155*** 
[1.089, 1.1430] 
Class: 
     Non-Fulltime-Labor 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     Self-Employed 1.2322 
[.6893, 2.2026] 
1.5968 
[.9132, 2.7920] 
     Management/ 
     Supervisors 
1.2867 
[.7036, 2.3530] 
1.3531 
[.7272, 2.5175] 
     Professionals 1.9798* 
[1.1331, 3.4591] 
1.5363 
[.8524, 2.7694] 
     Skilled Workers 1.4868 
[.8915, 2.4798] 
.9633 
[.5620, 1.6512] 
     Routine White 
     Collar Workers 
1.1501 
[.7339, 1.8025] 
1.5420 
[.9771, 2.433] 
     Semi/Un-Skilled  
     Workers 
.9247 
[.5802, 1.4737] 
1.0231 
[.6220, 1.6831] 
Education: 
     Less Than High School 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     High School 1.7485* 
[1.1190, 2.7321] 
2.6657*** 
[1.5783, 4.5023] 
     Some College 2.1606*** 
[1.3477, 3.4640] 
3.9952*** 
[2.3229, 6.8718] 
     Bachelor’s Degree 3.8964*** 
[2.1919, 6.9266] 
8.8382*** 
[4.7029, 16.6096] 
     Advanced Degree 3.5209*** 
[1.6578, 7.4778] 
8.5449*** 
[3.8243, 19.0926] 
Race and Ethnicity: 
     White 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     Black 2.4527*** 
[1.6556, 3.6335] 
.2969*** 
[.1648, .5347] 
     Asian .6224 
[.2397, 1.6164] 
.8775 
[.3177, 2.4238] 
     Native American .2014* 
[.0553, .7332] 
.5179 
[.1834, 1.4621] 
     Hispanic .8351 
[.4865, 1.4333] 
.6525 
[.3630, 1.1727] 
     Missing 2.2480 
[.8953, 5.6442] 
.7860 
[.2644, 2.3367] 
Religion: 
     Other 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     Protestant .9987 
[.6917, 1.4418] 
1.2272 
[.8345, 1.8048] 
     Catholic 1.2689 
[.8501, 1.8938] 
1.484 
[.9813, 2.2444] 
     Jewish 1.8943 
[.6067, 5.9142] 
.4701 
[.1216, 1.8175] 
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     Missing .6920 
[.4404, 1.0873] 
1.024 
[.6313, 1.6590] 
Interest in Politics: 
     Not Much  Interested 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     Somewhat  
     Interested 
4.0168*** 
[2.8093, 5.7437] 
3.0078*** 
[2.1025, 4.3027] 
     Very Interested 10.3481*** 
[6.8828, 15.6810] 
5.9083*** 
[3.9000, 8.9508] 
Income: 
     Less than $2999.00 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     $3,000-$19,999 1.8242* 
[1.143, 2.9157] 
1.2109 
[.7276, 2.0152] 
     $20,000-$39,999 1.7953* 
[1.0974, 2.9371] 
1.6854* 
[1.0038, 2.8298] 
     $40,000-$59,999 1.9384* 
[1.1002, 3.4150] 
1.2263 
[.6771, 2.2211] 
     $60,000-$79,999 2.6112* 
[1.0332, 6.5988] 
2.8145* 
[1.1000, 7.2010] 
     $80,000-$119,999 1.8621 
[.7590, 4.5688] 
2.3474 
[.9598, 5.7408] 
     $120,000-And  
     Above 
1.5103 
[.4753, 4.7996] 
1.5623 
[.5236, 4.6620] 
     Missing 1.5391 
[.8100, 2.9246]  
1.7950 
[.9318, 3.4578] 
Sex:  
     Male 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     Female 1.2905 
[.9671, 1.7220] 
1.1642 
[.8617, 1.5730] 
Age 1.0283*** 
[1.0182, 1.0384] 
1.0097 
[.9996, 1.0200] 
Year:  
     2000 
 
(ref.) 
 
(ref.) 
     2004 .6794** 
[.5140, .8980] 
1.1877 
[.8922, 1.5809] 
Intercept -.2604388 -8.900409 
N 2190 2190 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 .537 
Log Likelihood 1644.258 
BIC 3811.549 
Brackets indicate 95% Confidence Intervals.   
p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Odds Ratios of 1 indicate no effect, less than 1 indicate a negative effect, more than 1indicates a positive effect.  
 
As reported in Tables 6 and 7, the education and race/ethnicity variables are 
also significant indicators of voting behavior in model 3, and Tables 6 and 7 illustrate 
the predicted probabilities for the different education and race/ethnicity categories.  
Tables 6 and 7 also show that education and race/ethnicity provide a sociological 
foundation, or starting point, in the decision to vote.  Both scales are normally 
distributed around each racial/ethnic category.  Table 6 indicates that Blacks at the 
median of the moral-traditionalism scale have a 73.48 percent chance of voting 
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Democrat versus not voting, and only a 9.43 percent chance of voting Republican.  
Whites in the same category only have a 38.01 percent chance of voting Democrat.  
In Table 7, the predicted probabilities are similar to those in Table 6, showing that 
Blacks at the median of the market-fundamentalism scale have a 68.33 percent for 
voting Democrat and 13.31 percent chance of voting Republican versus not voting.   
Table 6. 
 
Voting Probability Among Social Groups by Moral-Traditionalism 
Holding Market-Fundamentalism Constant 
       
  Democrat   Republican  
Group 
10th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
General Population 86.84 42.72 5.07 3.56 34.84 82.28 
Occupation       
     Professionals 90.98* 51.28* 6.65* 2.88 32.28 83.24 
ŧNon-Labor  85.15 40.89 4.96 3.47 33.17 80.09 
Education       
     High School 84.86* 42.05* 5.52* 2.98*** 29.30*** 76.60*** 
     Some College 86.31*** 41.73*** 4.89*** 3.67*** 35.26*** 82.29*** 
     Bachelor’s 89.57*** 42.96*** 4.33*** 4.67*** 44.26*** 89.38*** 
     Adv. Degree 88.73*** 40.86*** 4.05*** 4.95*** 45.32*** 89.44*** 
ŧLess Than HS 78.5 37.76 6.35 1.8 17.25 57.73 
Race/Ethnicity       
     Black 94.75*** 73.48*** 21.46*** .61*** 9.43*** 54.83*** 
     Native Amer. 57.69* 15.25* 1.46* 7.91 41.57 78.97 
ŧWhite 85.22 38.01 4.03 4.54 40.31 85.05 
ŧ=Reference group in model      
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001     
Only significant differences are shown.     
 
The influence of race/ethnicity on voting is second only to the influence of both 
ideological scales.  The influence of race/ethnicity is so large that the predicted 
probability of a black individual who was in the 90th percentile on the market-
fundamentalism scale but at the median on the moral-traditionalism scale is only 
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54.83 percent.  These predicted probabilities show the powerful link both ideological 
dimensions have to voting behavior.  Only Blacks have an influence on their voting 
behavior that is capable of counteracting the effects of a strong ideological stance.   
Table 7. 
 
Voting Probability Among Social Groups by Market-Fundamentalism 
Holding Moral-Traditionalism Constant 
       
   Democrat   Republican  
Group 
10th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
General Population 77.68 35.16 2.72 3.47 43.51 93.16 
Occupation       
     Professionals 84.56* 43.00* 3.52* 2.92 41.08 93.21 
ŧNon-Labor  74.76 33.71 2.71 3.32 41.53 92.33 
Education       
     High School 73.91* 35.15* 3.10* 2.82*** 37.18*** 90.79*** 
     Some College 76.86*** 34.25*** 2.62*** 3.56*** 43.93*** 93.19*** 
     Bachelor’s 83.47*** 34.17*** 2.20*** 4.74*** 53.76*** 95.86*** 
     Adv. Degree 82.16*** 32.53*** 2.06*** 5.00*** 54.76*** 95.93*** 
ŧLess Than HS 63.47 32.57 4.23 1.59 22.6 81.21 
Race/Ethnicity       
     Black 89.72*** 68.33*** 14.15*** .63*** 13.31*** 76.33*** 
     Native Amer. 40.68* 11.89* .81* 6.08 49.21 92.58 
ŧWhite 75.66 30.59 2.12 4.4 49.25 64.39 
ŧ=Reference group in model      
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001     
Only significant differences are shown.     
 
Viewing the education categories reveals that the large increase in turnout due to 
education happens between the categories of “less than high school” and “high school 
or greater,” but this difference is substantively minor at 5.2 percent.  Occupation also 
only has marginal influence on voting behavior, and only between professionals and 
those not in the labor force.   
When it comes to telling the story about voting behavior, my findings indicate 
that most of the story lies with ideology.  Race/ethnicity also has a large role to play 
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in understanding voting behavior, but the value dimensions of moral-traditionalism 
and market-fundamentalism truly dominate compared to the other influences.  This is 
not to say that the traditional sociological indicators are not substantively important.  
Rather, the distinction between one and two dimensions is important because it 
highlights how the organization of ideology influences voter turnout, and how the 
single-dimension conceptualizations of ideology mislabels moderates, the 
ideologically ambivalent, and the ideologically apathetic.  Because a majority of the 
population is located on the center of one dimension while having a pronounced 
position on the other, a single-dimensional operationalization forces them into 
categories that make them seem to be very conservative, very liberal, or simply 
“moderate.”  These three categories are nondescript and fail to define what being a 
“liberal” or “conservative” means.  Given the ideological layout of the population, 
and the independent power of each dimension, however, my findings indicate that 
most individuals should be considered high (or low) –centers on either moral-
traditionalist or market-fundamentalist dimensions.  For those with who do fit the 
single-dimension framework, and are strongly liberal on both dimensions or strongly 
conservative on both dimensions, there is little chance that they will not vote along 
traditional party lines.  However, these individuals are relatively rare in the general 
population (9.27 percent progressive-progressive and 11.46 percent conservative-
conservative).  Likewise, those who would be considered high on one dimension and 
low on the other are even rarer (5.8 percent total).  My findings indicate that 
individuals only need to be pulled to the polls by one of the two ideological 
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dimensions to raise their turnout for one party while lowering it for the other, and that 
apathy, moderation, or ambivalence (i.e. middle scale scores) on the other dimension 
do not considerably hinder their probability of voting.   
Most of the population is high or low on one dimension while trending toward 
the center on the other (45.44 percent of the population).  As such, the independence 
of the two ideological dimensions is critical to understanding voter turnout because it 
means that “ideological voting” is a plausible mechanism for a much greater segment 
of the population than the single-dimension approach would estimate.  Further, the 
two-dimension approach illustrates the value dimensions that are important to voters 
in the different blocks of each party’s electoral coalitions, while a single-dimension 
schema simply hides their existence.  Insofar as the positions held by an individual do 
not contradict each other in relation to the ideological positions of the parties 
themselves, a strong position on one dimension is sufficient to substantially raise the 
probability of voting for the appropriate party, thus creating electoral coalitions, not 
bases.  Both the progressive moral-traditionalists and progressive market-
fundamentalists that trend toward the center on the other respective dimension make 
up the majority of the Democratic Party electoral coalition (21.74 percent of the 
population), with the individuals who are progressive on both making up the third 
portion (9.27 percent).  The Republican Party is similarly based on a coalition made 
up of conservative moral-traditionalists and market-fundamentalists that trend toward 
the center on the other dimension (23.7 percent) with those who are conservative on 
both dimensions rounding out the coalition (11.47 percent of the population).  If those 
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who are progressive on both dimensions and those who are conservative on both 
dimensions are added to the appropriate coalitions, then 31.01 percent of the 
population falls in the ideological coalition of the Democrats and 35.46 percent of the 
population falls within the Republican ideological coalition.  Each electoral coalition 
is thus made up of three distinct ideological groups.  Both political parties take 
positions that are far more liberal and conservative than most of the population 
(Gelman and Park 2008).  My findings indicate that such stances are possible because 
the influence of each dimension on voting behavior is independent, allowing the 
parties to build their ideological electoral coalitions without loosing too many voters 
due to their relatively extreme positions.  It is not simply that ideology directly 
influences the decisions of whether to vote and for whom, but also that the structure 
of ideology has important impacts as well.  A single-dimension perspective is neither 
accurate nor useful in illuminating these details. 
CONCLUSION 
My analysis stresses the importance of using a dual-dimensional ideological 
framework to better understand voter turnout.  In contrast to single-dimension 
ideological conceptualizations, a dual-dimensional approach provides a more accurate 
portrait of the ideological influences that drive voting behavior.  Traditional single- 
dimension ideological conceptualizations assume that moral-traditionalist and 
market-fundamentalist values covary, such that those who are more moral-
traditionalist are also more market-fundamentalist and vice versa.  On this foundation, 
single-dimension studies of voter behavior have shown that ideology is a major 
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predictor of voting turnout indicating that liberals and conservatives vote more often 
and more consistently than moderates (Lacy and Burden 1999).  Traditional single-
dimension studies, however, leave unaddressed the question: how much of the 
population plausibly uses ideological motivation to strongly influence their voting 
decisions?  And understanding this question requires a more accurate portrait of 
organization of ideology in the population.  My findings suggest that ideology should 
be treated within a dual-dimensional framework.  While my findings do support the 
conclusion that individuals who are hold consistent extreme values along both of my 
two dimensions vote more than individuals who were in the middle of both 
dimensions, my analysis finds that they are relatively rare (20.73 percent of the 
population combined).  Rather, I find that most individuals hold distinct views on one 
dimension while trending toward the center on the other (45.44 percent of the 
population), and that the effects of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism 
on voting behavior are independent of one another.  As such, the single-dimension 
framework is also inadequate because it forces individuals into categories that make 
them seem to be more extreme than they may actually be or it places them in a 
“moderate” category which may only be partially accurate.  The size of the 
population that is truly moderate on both the moral-traditionalist and market-
fundamentalist ideological dimensions is only 29.09 percent of the population, and is 
relatively small compared to the other six ideological voting blocks (66.17 percent of 
the population).   
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Single-dimension conceptualizations show this point, but hide the important 
details that ultimately contribute to electoral success below these broad strokes.  The 
independence of effect between each dimension, when combined with the pattern that 
individuals tend to hold distinct views on one dimension while trending toward the 
center on the other, indicates that the Republicans and Democrats each have three 
relatively distinct ideological bases that form their electoral coalitions.  The 
Democrats depend on one group who is more moral-traditionalist than the general 
population, but trends toward the center on the market-fundamentalist dimension.  
Another group that is much less market-fundamentalist than the general population, 
but trends toward the center on the moral-traditionalist dimension.  And finally a 
group that is progressive on both dimensions.  Likewise, the Republicans depend on 
support from three groups as well.  Republicans depend on those who are more 
moral-traditionalist, but trends toward the center on the market-fundamentalist 
dimension.   A second group, that are more market-fundamentalist, yet trend toward 
the center on the moral-traditionalist dimension.  And finally, the third group, that is 
conservative on both dimensions.  Each of these bases vote more often and more 
consistently than those who are moderate on both dimensions, and those who are high 
on one dimension but low on the other, and vice versa.  Utilizing a single-dimension 
approach obscures how the structure of ideology influences voter turnout and vote 
choice, but a dual-dimensional approach highlights the ideological coalitions from 
which each party draws their support.  Just as importantly, the multi-dimensional 
approach shows that these coalitions are possible because the influences of each 
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dimension on voting behavior are independent of the other.  This last point is a 
distinction that single-dimension approaches obscure, and yet another reason why the 
two-dimension approach should be utilized to study political action. 
While there is a vast literature on the dual-dimensionality of political ideology, 
studies applying a dual-dimensional framework to political action are all too rare.  
This study furthers research on the dual-dimensional nature of ideology by showing 
that understanding the structure of ideology is paramount to understanding voter 
turnout.  However, in this study, I only addressed U.S. presidential elections.  
Motivations for voting in local, state, and even congressional elections likely differ 
from presidential elections.  My findings concerning the strength of ideology on voter 
turnout show it to be the single largest factor in the decision process.  Further research 
should examine the extent to which, moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism 
influence smaller elections, and how their effects, if any, are different from 
presidential election patterns.  Additionally, further research should examine other 
avenues of civic participation.  Motivations for volunteering time to political 
campaigns and making monetary donations are just a few of the types of participation 
that a multi-dimensional perspective could shed further light on.   
My focus on moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism may also 
require further examination or expansion.  It is probable that there are more than two 
distinct ideological dimensions that are arranged within left-right frameworks, and 
while the addition of a third racial-ideological dimension is unlikely to substantively 
change my findings (see Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004), its existence would add an 
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important nuance because of the power of the race/ethnicity variable in my analysis.  
It would be interesting to see if the commitment of the black community to the 
Democrats, and their rejection of the Republicans is related to the Moskowitz and 
Jenkins (2004) ideological dimension they call “racial liberalism.”  Further, it is 
plausible that while the effects of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism 
are independent, their effects on voting behavior may not be independent of other 
ideological dimensions.  Given Moskowitz and Jenkins’ (2004) finding of three 
correlated dimensions (social, economic, and racial) in the 1988 data, and the current 
candidacy of Barack Obama, the question of a third racial ideological dimension in 
the U.S. population is truly a contemporary issue deserving of further inquiry. 
The application of a dual-dimensional ideological approach to the question of 
polarization would also be fruitful.  Ideological polarization has been a question that 
has been operationalized in many ways. Many studies only find limited support for 
polarization when examining individual issue opinions (DiMaggio, Evans, and 
Bryson 1996; Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio 2001; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006).   
With the exception of Fiorina et al. (2006), these studies treat ideology as single-
dimensional.  The nuances and details of the ideological layout of the population raise 
two questions concerning polarization. First, within the dimension of moral-
traditionalism, is the U.S. population more polarized today than in the past, and has a 
similar shift occurred within the market-fundamentalist dimension?  And second, is 
my finding of four relatively distinct ideological bases evidence for a type of inter-
dimension polarization?  Research on these questions is important because they 
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would provide a temporal context to my analysis of the 2000 and 2004 data.  
Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) also claim that the ideological sophistication of the 
population has increased substantially over the past thirty years utilizing a single- 
dimensional framework.  Further research should examine the extent to which this 
finding holds within a multi-dimensional framework. 
Applying a dual-dimensional ideological framework to the study of 
ambivalence would also be a useful endeavor.  The independence of effect on voting 
behavior between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions 
indicates that ambivalence, apathy, or moderation on one dimension does not hinder 
the impact of the other dimension on voting behavior.  Further research should 
examine those at the middle of each dimension to determine whether they are 
primarily ambivalent toward the values of moral-traditionalism and market-
fundamentalism, apathetic or have some other type of “middleness” in their political 
opinions.  Additionally, many studies examine ambivalence toward the parties and 
candidates themselves, yet utilize a single-dimension ideological approach (Basinger 
and Lavine 2005; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007).  A reoccurring theme is 
the occurrence of ideological voting in relation to partisan ambivalence, and depends 
on interactions between ideology and measures of ambivalence.  In view of the fact 
that my findings indicate that single-dimensional conceptualizations of ideology 
obscure important ideological divisions in the population, some of the literature on 
ambivalence and ideology needs to be reconsidered.  Given the independence of 
effect on voting behavior between moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism, 
 43
it is possible that ambivalent partisan attitudes could interact with each ideological 
dimension differently.  Since my findings indicate that the majority of the population 
fits the pattern of having a distinct ideological position on one dimension while 
trending toward the center on the other, exploring the relationship between the 
multiple dimensions of ideology and different areas of political ambivalence, 
including ideological ambivalence, represents an important avenue for further 
research.   
Voting is the most basic form of civic participation, and grappling with the 
structure of ideology is important to understanding motivations for voter turnout.  
Contrary to studies using a single-dimension ideological framework that show the 
majority of the population in the ideological middle, my findings show that most 
people have distinct ideological reasons to participate from one dimension while 
trending toward the center on the other dimension.  Because of the power of ideology 
to the voting act, individuals need not be extreme in their ideological outlook to act 
on these motivations.  The independence of effect on voting behavior from the 
ideological dimensions of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism is central 
to this point.  Moderation, apathy, or ambivalence, on one dimension does not 
influence the other dimension’s effect on voting behavior, and that means that a great 
deal of the population, while being quite centrist on one dimension, is sufficiently 
ideologically charged on the other dimension to participate.  The liberal/conservative 
framework represents an organizing principle, and both the moral-traditionalist and 
market-fundamentalist dimensions are organized accordingly.  But each dimension is 
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distinct, has independent effects on voter behavior, and both should not be combined 
into a single liberal/conservative ideological framework.   
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APPENDIX A 
ANES Moral-Traditionalism Scale Items 
1. The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those 
changes. 
2. The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society. 
3. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry, and government. Others feel that a woman’s place is in the home. 
4. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? 
• 1.  The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God. 
• 3.  The Bible is the word of God, but not everything in it should be taken 
literally, word for word. 
• 5.  The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for 
word. 
5. This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on 
traditional family ties. 
6. We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral 
standards, even if they are very different from our own. 
7. Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be 
legally permitted to adopt children? 
8. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination? 
9. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? 
• 1.  By law, abortion should never be permitted. 
• 2.  The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the 
woman’s life is in danger. 
• 3.  Don’t Know 
• 4.  The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger 
to the woman’s life, but only after need for the abortion has been clearly 
established. 
• 5.  By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of 
personal choice. 
10. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 
11. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to 
come to the United States to live should be  
• 1.  Increased a lot 
• 2.  Increased a little 
• 3.  Left the same/Don’t Know  
• 4.  Decreased a little  
• 5.  Decreased a lot? 
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APPENDIX B 
ANES Market-Fundamentalism Scale Items 
Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you thought about it. 
1. 1=Government should decrease defense spending / 7=Government should increase 
defense spending. 
2. 1=Government insurance plan / 7=Private insurance plan. 
3. 1=Government should see to jobs and standard of living / 7=Government should let each 
person get ahead on their own. 
4. 1=Government should provide many more services / 7=Government should provide 
many fewer services. 
The following questions were recoded so that the conservative response was coded 5, the middle 
response was coded 3, and the liberal response was coded 1. 
5. Should federal spending on Social Security be increased, decreased or kept about the 
same? 
6. Should federal spending on Public Schools be increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same? 
7. Should federal spending on Child Care be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? 
8. Should federal spending on Aid to Poor People be increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same? 
9. Should federal spending on Tightening Border Security to Prevent Illegal Immigration be 
increased, decreased, or kept about the same? 
10. Should federal spending on Welfare Programs be increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same? 
11. Should federal spending on Foreign Aid be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? 
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